The ultimate objective of joint military operations is to bring to bear a swift, decisive, efficient blow to the adversary. It demonstrates the speed, efficiency, and flexibility the joint fires community strives for, by linking weapons effects to the Joint Force Commander's campaign or operation objectives through component operations. 
I. Introduction
The ultimate objective of joint military operations is to bring to bear a swift, decisive, and efficient blow to the adversary.
…the target lay in a location with engagement zones already established. A U.S. forward air controller on the ground contacted the CAOC 1 which passed the target to a B-52 overhead, 19 minutes after initial call the B-52 dropped its load on the enemy… Since the dawn of aviation, there has been tension between land and air force providers regarding control of fires on the battlefield. Much of a land commander's fire support does not come from organic assets, but instead is provided by other components, thus the need for continual coordination. 4 Overlaps and redundancies occur primarily in the deep battle areaan ill defined area at the far limits of tactical level operations and at the close limits of operational level operations. 5 Evolution of joint fires doctrine, exponential improvements in capabilities and changes in threat that have impacted the perceptions of FSCMs, and specifically, the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), are well documented. It is not the intention of this paper to conduct a historical review but rather begin with an analysis of where gaps exist between land and air components with regard to FSCMs to set the context.
These seams are in the areas of the deep versus the close battle, the operational definition of the FSCL and its application to a noncontiguous battlefield. Having identified the impact of these problem areas, the paper will then suggest potential solutions that mitigate their effects and improve the combatant commander's ability to synchronize joint fires.
II. Seams In The Joint Fire Environment
In the past, the close and deep battle areas were effectively separated by component capability, and the division of responsibility was delineated by the FSCL. are transnational, elusive, and embedded in environments that require precision operations to avoid collateral damage. Future operations will require heavy special operations involvement with conventional forces in supported or supporting roles. There may be less of a chance of fratricide due to the small footprint of a SOF team, but the level of detailed integration required between a section of aircraft with live ordinance and a SOF team on the ground is no less important. 15 The result is that the rapid evolution of technology is shortening the decision loop while at the same time the noncontiguous battlefield will require much more coordination to synchronize operations and prevent fratricide.
Whereas in previous times we could chop up the battlespace and delegate the various pieces to the components as battlespace becomes more nonlinear and combat power is applied more asymmetrically this is a luxury we can no longer afford.
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The fire support seams identified above and the increasing complexity of the noncontiguous battlefield call for another look at fire support coordination.
III. A New Way Of Looking At Joint Fire Control
If joint fires are integrated correctly, they will complement and reinforce each other resulting in synergistic combat power applied at the decisive point in a manner consistent with the combatant commander's priorities and concept of operations. It is worth mentioning briefly that often "grid reference system" and "kill box system" are used interchangeably and ought not to be. A grid system is merely a group of 18 JP 3-09, A-1 19 JP 3-09, IV-13 horizontal and vertical lines at standardized distances that can be used for fire support coordination, airspace deconfliction, and target identification. Kill box refers to a generic three dimensional block of battlespace defined by theater determined parameters. 20 Thus, a common grid reference system can be used to define the lateral dimensions of a kill box. It is not the intent of this paper to determine which of the three is best, but rather to focus on one example to further explore the relevance of general grid reference systems. 21 AF Doctrine Watch #9, 2.
22 Quintrall, 11. positioning satellites (GPS) vice visual points of reference. The requirement to relate FSCMs to a prominent geographical features is difficult in austere terrain, and impossible at night and during inclement weather. Using the grid system will mean that FSCMs and other control measures on the battlefield will no longer depend on prominent geographical features for identification, and given a platform's GPS capability, can be located far more accurately.
The benefits of using a grid system to build and promulgate FSCMs cannot be overstated. If adopted as a standard, both air and ground based fire support providers will be completely familiar with the FSCMs in any theater. This will only apply if a standard convention of establishing and naming grid coordinate boxes is adopted. While the actual boxes in use will change as the threat changes and the campaign evolves, the coordinates describing potential FSCMs will not change. Therefore, the only required coordination for a change in FSCMs will be passing to ground and air units whether a box is "on" or "off" thus making prior coordination far less complicated. As an example, the CENTCOM CONOPS for Joint Fires promulgates the following delineation of fire support control responsibilities:
1. Grid Boxes short of the FSCL remain closed to air attack until opened by the land component commander. An open grid box short of the FSCL represents clearance from that commander for the air component commander assets to fire on specified targets in accordance with land commander's priorities without direct, positive terminal control. Additional yet simple rule sets allow time for clearance of ground and or airborne forces before action can be taken on a change in kill box status.
Another area requiring improvement is the employment of the FSCL. Despite the best efforts of joint doctrine definitions, the FSCL is used as a de facto border delineating control of fires between the JFLCC and the JFACC. However, the FSCL was designed to "facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure" 23 rather than serving as a division of battlefield responsibilities. A management tool is needed to separate areas where functional components have the preponderance of assets to employ, while they are not the primary force providers in adjacent areas. Fires Coordinator (JFFC). At the request of the Joint Staff, the study was asked to consider advantages/disadvantages, long range implications, impact on joint doctrine and joint targeting procedures, and lessons learned from joint exercises. 30 The study concluded that "Adopting the JFFC should provide an improvement in joint operations efficiency regarding synchronization of joint fires with the JFC's campaign plan; but it will be accompanied with a moderate price in personnel, training, and C4 systems support." 31 The concept has been contentious and therefore is not fully developed in joint doctrine. Two potential disconnects are the role of the JFE in the joint targeting process which is often delegated to the JFACC. 30 Hubner, Bob "Joint Force Fires Coordinator Study" A Common Perspective, 5 no.1 (March 1997): 9. 31 Hubner, 11. One could argue that despite its warts, the current doctrine and definitions of fire support coordination measures are adequate. Outstanding, well trained personnel throughout the command and control system ensure that joint fires are coordinated and affect the battlefield as desired without fratricide. However, the current system (see Figure 5 ) of coordinating fires between all components is complex and depends on many incompatible systems to work together flawlessly. The standing JFE would be charged with watching over this complicated command and control structure and would be charged with ultimate responsibility for fire support coordination should any links break down. An alternate to the standing JFE is that the JFLCC should be the deep strike battle interdiction coordinator for the JTF. Because current doctrine stipulates that the land component sets the location of the FSCL, "The commander who establishes and adjusts the FSCL within his boundaries should be responsible for all operations within his boundaries."
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Because the JFLCC will be focused on the current battle and preparing for the immediate threats to follow, he is likely to pay less attention to deeper areas bordering the FSCL.
Furthermore, due to the fast paced and changing nature of warfare, it is unlikely the JFLCC can fully assess the impact moving the FSCL would have on operations outside his immediate area of operations. "The emotion of ground combat begs for every available asset to support the present battle." 34 Keeping a big picture view that encompasses the entire joint task force is the primary benefit of the JFE concept.
V. Recommendations
Tying together the concepts of the grid box system, the JECL, and the JFE, a completely new way of controlling joint fires, resolves our longstanding doctrinal disagreements on how to manage and effectively and efficiently employ joint fires. Additionally, using the three concepts outlined above and the flexibility that the concepts offer to the joint force commander ensures that joint fires can be coordinated on a linear as well as a nonlinear/noncontiguous battlefield. All three concepts need to be more fully codified in joint and service publications. Additionally, as with any new warfare concept, the grid coordination system, JECL, and standing JFE must be part of joint training exercises with realistic joint scenarios and force participation. Training as a joint force builds trust among the components and is sure to ease future implementation of these concepts. 
